


# Presuppositions vs. Scalar Implicatures: an Experimental Study

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**Fig. 1: General patterns**




Presuppositions trigger universal inferences (UP), sensitive to the monotonicity of the quantifier.

Implicatures do not trigger universal inferences.

Endorsement rates of inferences depending on: 1) nature of the trigger; 2) monotonicity of the quantifier (UE, DE or nonDE); 3) the form of the inference (UP or SI).


**Fig.2: The quantifier ‘No’**



The predictions of SI (similar to EP here) are too weak for presuppositions.


Endorsement rates of inferences in *No* sentences depending on: 1) the nature of the trigger (pres. vs. impl.); 2) the nature of the inference: universal (UP) vs. existential (i.e. SI here). (Results for “Each” are given as a reference).

**Fig.3: Differences between quantifiers**



Robustness of universal inferences for **presuppositions** depends on the quantifier.

**Fig.4: The quantifier ‘Less than 3’**



UP and SI inferences are similar for presuppositions ( $F(1, 29) = 3.16; p = .086$ ); different for implicatures ( $F(1, 29) = 17.2; p < .001$ ).

Endorsement rates of inferences in *Less than 3* sentences depending on: 1) the nature of the trigger (pres. vs. impl.); 2) the nature of the inference: universal (UP) vs. implicature-like (SI).

## 1. The problem

Sentences in (1) contain a presupposition trigger in the scope of a quantifier; what do they presuppose?

- (1) a. No student knows that he is stupid.
- b. Less than 3 students know they are stupid.
- c. More than 3 students know they are stupid.

Schematically: if  $Q$  is a quantifier, if  $A$  and  $B$  are predicates, if  $B$  presupposes  $B'$ , what does (2) presuppose?

- (2)  $[Qx : A(x)]B(x)$  presupposes:  
 $\exists x A(x) \wedge B'(x)?$ ;  $\neg([Qx : A(x)]B'(x))?$ ;  $[\forall x : A(x)]B'(x)?$

## 2. Proposals

Presuppositions are studied as a kind of **inferences**.

(See Kadmon (2001) for discussion of UP and EP)

### • Universal Presupposition (UP).

Heim (1983) and Schlenker (2006) both predict that every sentence in (1) presupposes:

- (3) Every student is stupid.

Important note: Schlenker’s derivation of presuppositions involves a competitor. This competitor may be degraded for independent reasons and this raises new predictions about relative strengths of presuppositions (i.e. robustness of inferences across speakers, contexts...).

### • Existential Presupposition (EP).

Beaver (1994, 2001) argues that sentences in (1) presuppose:

- (4) There is a stupid student.

Note: In Upward Entailing (UE) contexts (e.g., (1c)), the presupposition is weaker than the assertion and, thus, does not produce detectable additional inferences.

### • Scalar Implicature (SI).

EP predictions are weaker than what a straightforward theory in terms of scalar implicatures could predict. Assuming for instance that factive verbs are involved in asymmetrical scales like  $\langle p, x \text{ know } p \rangle$ . The prediction is now that sentences in (1) imply respectively:

- (5) a. At least one student is stupid. (similar to EP)  
i.e.  $\neg(\text{No student is stupid})$
- b. At least 3 students are stupid. (stronger than EP)  
i.e.  $\neg(\text{Less than 3 students are stupid})$
- c. No additional inference (similar to EP)

Important note: This account passes the S-sentences (negation, conditional, question) test for presuppositions.

## 3. Aims and questions

This debate has suffered from two difficulties:

- 1) Sentences in (1) raise two superfluous difficulties (domain restrictions and irrelevant bound readings) also present in original examples;
- 2) The judgments involved are too subtle to rely on the introspection abilities of a few people.

With these difficulties in mind, our aim was to:

- Establish an effective methodology to obtain robust data
- Compare UP and SI (similar to or stronger than EP).
- Investigate finer-grained differences between quantifiers, triggers etc.

## 4. Experimental methodology

- 30 native speakers of French
- Context: *After an exam session, 5 or 6 teachers individually met 10 students of their class (including a student named John); these teachers now informally discuss about their students. These teachers are very well informed about their students, honest, fair...*
- Non logical inferential task, 2 examples were provided:

“John & Mary did A.”  
suggests that:  
John did A.  
No Yes

“John did A and B.”  
suggests that:  
John did A before B.  
No Yes

- We eliminated potential problems due to domain restrictions by explicitly referring to a particular set of individuals (e.g., *None of these 10 students replaced No student*).

### Experimental conditions

- Triggers:
  - Presupposition triggers: *know* and *ignore*, *start* and *stop*, definite descriptions (*his computer*).
  - Implicatures:  $\langle \text{all, some} \rangle$ ,  $\langle \text{and, or} \rangle$ ,  $\langle \text{excellent, good} \rangle$
- Environments:
  - Inferences: universal (UP) and implicature-like (SI)
  - ‘Quantifiers’: *John*, *I doubt that John*, *More than 3 of these 10 s.*, *Each...*, *Less than 3...*, *None...*, *Exactly 3...*

## 5. Four examples

(Pres. triggered by *know*; quantifier: *Less than 3-DE*)

1. Less than 3 of these 10 students know that their father is about to receive a congratulation letter.

~ The father of each of these 10 students is about to receive a congratulation letter. (UP)

2. Less than 3... know that their father is about to receive a c.l.

~ The father of at least 3... is about to receive a c.l. (SI)

(Impl. triggered by  $\langle \text{and, or} \rangle$ ; quantifier: *No - DE*)

3. None... read the handout and did an exercise.

~ Each... did (at least) one or the other. (UP)

4. None... read the handout and did an exercise.

~ At least one... did (at least) one among the two. (SI)


## 6. Results

- Presuppositions are not implicatures (cf. Fig.1).
- *No* sentences trigger universal presuppositions (cf. Fig.2), EP (or SI) predictions are too weak.
- Fig.1 suggests that DE quantifiers enable strong universal inferences, a closer look may moderate this conclusion (cf. Fig.3). (This does not weaken the previous conclusion about SI or EP, cf. Fig.4).
- In certain environments, *ignore* may be ‘more factive’ than *know* (cf. Fig.5) as discussed by Schlenker.
- Resisting global accommodation is costly (cf. Fig.6).

## 7. Conclusions


- Efficient and simple **methodology**; crucial improvement of the data
- **Universal presuppositions** are established
- Presuppositions and scalar implicatures are differentiated (while classical presuppositions tests did not)
- **Subtler differences** as suggested by Schlenker (2006) become accessible

**Fig.5: Ignore vs. Know**



Endorsement rates of universal inferences depending on 1) the factive verb (*ignore* vs. *know*) and 2) the quantifier in the target sentence.

**Fig.6: Different processing profiles**



Implicature inferences require additional time (NS cf. Bott & Noveck, 2004), **Accommodation is the default** ( $F(1, 29) = 30.0; p < .001$ )

Acceptation and rejection latencies for presupposition (UP inferences) and implicatures (SI inferences).

## Notations:

UE/DE: Upward/Downward Entailing context (or quantifier by extension)  
 SI: Scalar Implicature (or inference predicted by scalar comparisons by extension)  
 UP: Universal Presupposition (or universal inference in general, for cases of scalar items)  
 The term “implicature” is often used as a shortcut for “(indirect) scalar implicature”

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